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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
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JEAN P. HENDRICKSON 
Murray City Deputy Prosecutor 
5025 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 264-2642 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, * 
a municipal corporation, 
* STATEMENT OF FACTS IN 
Plaintiff, SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
* PLEA OF GUILTY WITH 
VS. RESERVED RIGHT TO 
* APPEAL 
THOMAS L. HUBER 
2789 West Renae Street * 
West Jordan, Utah Case No. 89 200 1917 
DOB: 1-4-67 * 
Judge L. H. Griffiths 
Defendant. * 
TO THE COURT AND COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT: 
The above case came on for a non-jury trial before the 
Honorable L. H. Griffiths of the Third Circuit Court, Murray 
Department, September 15, 1989, at 10:00 a.m. At that date and 
time the court did accept defense counsel's motion to enter a 
change of plea to guilty to all three charged misdemeanors, viz., 
Driving under the Influence, Carrying an open container in a 
vehicle, and Escape from official custody. These pleas were 
conditioned upon Defendant's reserved right to appeal. The court 
also accepted Plaintiff's motion that a written statement of 
facts as to all charges be made a part of the record to assist 
the court of appeals should that appeal be made. The factual 
statement as adopted and approved by the court is as follows: 
1. On or about March 17, 1989, Officer Mark Lindgren, 
Murray City Police Department, was on duty. 
2. Officer Lindgren's primary duty entails enforcement 
of alcohol-related ordinances adopted by Murray City in 
accordance with the Utah Code. 
3. At or about 11:44 p.m. Officer Lindgren was in his 
patrol car and stopped at a red light at the intersection of 
State Street and Vine Street; at this location his attention was 
drawn to a blue Chevrolet, facing northbound on State Street, 
also waiting at the light in the left-only turn lane apparently 
intending to head westbound. The driver of the vehicle was, in 
Officer Lindgren1s words, "revving" his engine. 
4. As Officer Lindgren continued to wait, the arrow 
light for drivers turning left turned green but the driver of the 
blue Chevrolet did not turn; the arrow light then turned red and 
the light for through traffic did change to green; Officer 
Lindgren's attention was further drawn to the blue Chevrolet as 
it proceeded to make a left turn from State Street onto Vine 
Street against a red light for those turning left. 
5. Officer Lindgren activated his patrol vehicle's 
overhead light bar and followed the blue Chevrolet onto Vine 
Street; Officer Lindgren did pull the vehicle over to the side of 
the road to initiate contact with the driver. 
6. Officer Lindgren approached the vehicle and made 
contact with the driver; the odor of an alcoholic beverage was 
detected by the officer upon making this contact. 
-2 -
7. The officer inquired whether the driver had been 
drinking; the officer recorded in writing the detained driver's 
pre-arrest statement as "I haven't had that much." At Officer 
Lindgren's request, a driver's license with a photograph provided 
identification of the driver as Thomas L. Huber, date of birth 
01-04-67. 
8. The officer inquired whether the detained driver 
had any problems with his legs and upon a negative response the 
officer requested that the driver perform certain field sobriety 
tests. The tests, first explained and demonstrated by the 
officer, conducted and the driver's performance are as follows: 
a. Horizontal gaze nystagmus. 
b. One-leg stand: driver put foot down on counts 
8, 9, 13, and hopped and slid his foot throughout the test, also 
the arms were lifted contrary to the directions of the officer. 
c. Heel-to-toe walk: driver put foot out to side 
to maintain balance three times and crossed his feet one time 
almost tripping himself. 
d. Finger count: no counting mistakes but driver 
only performed the sequence twice as opposed to the directions 
requesting three times through the sequence. 
e. Hand clap: performed very slowly and double 
clapped verses the alternating single clap as requested. 
9. Based upon the driver's performance of the field 
sobriety tests (Officer Lindgren recorded the observed "errors" 
of the performance which were contrary to the standard procedure 
-3 -
as trained) and the observable physical characteristics noted by 
the officer (a moderate to strong odor of an alcoholic beverage, 
difficulty walking a straight line, and difficulty trying to 
remove his boots in that he exhibited an inability to find the 
zipper located on the inside of each boot), Officer Lindgren 
determined that the driver was too impaired to drive and informed 
the driver that he was being arrested for driving under the 
influence. 
10. After being handcuffed and frisked, the suspect 
was placed in the patrol car. 
11. After securing the suspect, Officer Lindgren 
searched the vehicle; an opened fifth bottle of whiskey was found 
on the floor, passenger side. The evidence was seized and placed 
into evidence. 
12. The suspect was transported to the Murray City 
Police Department for processing and to conduct a breath-alcohol 
test on the intoxilyzer machine maintained at that location. 
13. The suspect's mouth was checked by Officer 
Lindgren for any possibly contaminating matter at 11:42 p.m. 
This action occurred in the field at the time the officer 
informed the suspect he was under arrest. 
14. Officer Lindgren recorded the suspect's name 
(Thomas Huber), the date (3-17-89), the time (2359), the 
intoxilyzer machine's serial number (#27-102768), the location of 
the machine (MCPD), and the operator's (Lindgren) name on the 
heading of the CMI Intoxilyzer Operational Check List. Officer 
-4 -
Lindgren then performed the required operational steps to secure 
an accurate reading and noted his performance of the steps by 
checking the spot beside each step, eight in all. Beside step 6 
the calibration setting was recorded (.198). (The machine's 
proper calibration is .200 +/-.01.) Beside step 7 the breath 
sample alcohol concentration was recorded (.168). 
15. Officer Lindgren recorded the operator's initial 
(ML) , the instrument location (MCPD), the instrument serial 
number (27-102768), the date (3-17-89), the subject's name 
(Thomas L. Huber) , the time first observed (2342) , the time test 
started (2359) , the operator (Lindgren) , and additional 
information (cal .198, breath .168) on the Test Record card upon 
which the intoxilyzer machine prints and records the air blank 
cycle reading, the calibration reading, the breath sample 
reading, and a final air blank cycle reading. 
16. Officer Lindgren then informed the suspect, and 
defendant in this the above-captioned case, Thomas L. Huber that 
unless a responsible adult could pick him up at the police 
station he would remain in custody until released from official 
custody. The Defendant requested use of the restroom. As the 
holding cell was occupied by a female prisoner, Defendant Huber 
was escorted down the hall to the men's restroom in the police 
department which is located on the second floor of the municipal 
building. The handcuffs were unlocked to permit use of the 
restroom facilities; Officer Lindgren stood outside the door; 
approximately two or three minutes passed whereupon Officer 
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Lindgren heard substantial commotion within the restroom. Upon 
entering, the observable facts were that the window was ajar and 
the prisoner was gone. 
Defendant Thomas L. Huber was not advised of his rights 
nor questioned further because he was not still available to the 
officer. 
Officer Lindgren made contact with the Defendant's 
mother advising her of circumstances and requesting that Thomas 
Huber return to the police station should he appear at home. 
17. At approximately 2:20 a.m. the Defendant did 
contact Officer Lindgren; the Defendant was transported to the 
police station by his mother where he did sign a misdemeanor 
citation promising to appear for arraignment for the three 
offenses charged. 
18. On May 23, 1989, at 9:00 a.m., the above-captioned 
case came on for hearing of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
before the Honorable L. H. Griffiths. 
19. The Defendant's theory supporting the motion was 
that the stop was based merely on pretext. The hearing was had; 
Officer Lindgren was the only witness questioned at the 
suppression hearing. On cross-examination, questioning went 
beyond the facts surrounding only the stop; defense counsel on 
cross-examination inquired about the field sobriety tests and the 
intoxilyzer test and results including conformance with the 
requirements of the Baker Rule. The officer thus testified under 
cross-examination as to his perception of the Defendant's 
-6 -
impairment during the field tests, the odor of alcohol emanating 
from the person and the vehicle, the difficulty Defendant had 
trying to remove his boots, the sequence of checking the 
Defendant's mouth after handcuffs were placed on him, the 
recognition of the Baker Rule by the arresting officer, the 
proper operating procedures of the intoxilyzer being followed, 
and the results of the test being .16. 
20. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the 
court denied the Motion to Suppress and declined to rule on the 
admissibility of the intoxilyzer results in that the motion 
before the court did not address that issue nor was direct 
evidence presented with proper foundation being laid. 
WE COME NOW to the conclusion of the statement of facts 
leading to the arrest of the Defendant and to the request by the 
court for a statement of the facts to support the Defendant's 
guilty pleas to the three charges. 
DATED this /Q> day of October, 1989. 
Jean P. Hendricksen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Larry N. Long 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Statement of Facts In Support of Defendant's Plea of 
Guilty With Reserved Right to Appeal was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Larry N. Long, Attorney for Defendant, 39 Exchange Place, 
Second Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2708, this /C> day of 
October, 1989. 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
MURRAY CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS L. HUBER, 
Defendant, 
-oOo-
Case No. P92001S17 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
BZ IT REJiEKBERLD that on the 23rd day of May, 
1989, corrjrtencing at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the above-
entitled action was held before the HOKORABLh LeROY H. 
GRIFFITHS, sitting as Judge in the above-nair.ed Court, and 
that the following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the City: 
For the Defendant: 
MS. JEAN HENDRICKSON 
Deputy City Attorney 
Murray City Municipal Building 
5025 South State Street 
P.O. Box 7520 
Murray, Utah 84107-0520 
MR. LARRY N. LONG 
Attorney at Law 
39 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, C.S.R. 
3241 SOUTH 4840 WEST 
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84120 
PHONE: 966-4862 
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L i r c j c t I m a g i n a t i o n liy " s , F o n c i r i c k s o n 
C r o ^ s - t l i c a m i n a t i o n by \ r . Long 
R e d i r e c t i - x a n i n a t i on ] .y I T s . I l c n d r i c k s o n 
CITY P i S T S 
CLObING ARCU-iWT BY ilR. L3i;C 
CLOSIITG AT.GUJii:iJT BY I IS . HLTCPKICKGCTI 
* * * 
1
 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 THE COURT: This is the Third Judicial Circuit 
4
 Court, the Murray Department. I'm Judge L.H. Griffiths. 
5 This is the 23rd day of May, 1989, and time for a motion 
6 to suppress in the case of Murray City vs. Thomas L. Huber, 
7 89-1917. 
8 Is plaintiff ready and prepared to proceed? 
9 MS. HENDRICKSON: Yes, your Honor. We1re here 
10 with our witness. 
11 THE COURT: Is the defendant ready, prepared to 
12 proceed? 
13 MR. LONG: Defendant's ready, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. I think under the latest 
15 decision of the Utah Supreme Court, once a motion to 
16 suppress is filed—I assume your motion to dismiss, 
17 Mr. Long, is based upon the motion to suppress, isn't it? 
18 MR. LONG: Yes. That's correct. 
19 THE COURT: So, we'll—under that Supreme Court 
20 decision, the City may proceed then. She needs to—you 
21 need to call your witnesses on that. 
22 MS. HENDRICKSON: The City would like to call 
23 Officer Lindgren. 
24 ART LINDGREN, 
25 called as a witness by and on behalf of the City in this 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
matter, 
witness 
record 
after having been first duly sworn, assumed the 
stand, and was examined and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: I should say for the record, the 
should show that the defendant is present at this 
time, and he's represented by Mr. Larry Long. Murray City 
is 
BY 
represented by Jean Hendrickson. Thank you. 
MS. 
Q 
for the 
A 
City. 
Q 
City? 
of 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
You may proceed. 
MS. HENDRICKSON: Thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
HENDRICKSON; 
Would you please state your name and occupation 
record? 
Art Lindgren, I'm a police officer for Murray 
How long have you been an officer with Murray 
Be three years in August. 
Were you on duty th§ night of March 17th, 1989? 
Yes. 
What was your capacity during that duty shift? 
Ifm an alcohol enforcement officer. 
What time is that shift, normally run? 
From 6:00 p.m. in the afternoon until 4:00 a.m. 
During that shift, do you handle any other kinds 
situations, besides the alcohol enforcement? J 
3 I 
1 i 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A 
alcohol 
units* 
Q 
Only when we're busy, then they'll dispatch the 
cars to handle details and back—backing up other 
When you were on duty that night, the 17th, was 
your attention drawn to a blue Chevrolet? 
A 
Q 
you have 
A 
Q 
Yes. It was. 
And about what location did you notice—did 1 
\ your attention drawn to that vehicle? [ 
That would be on Vine and State. 
Do you see the driver of that vehicle here in 
the courtroom this morning? 
A 
Q 
A 
here. 
officer 
table• 
Q 
vehicle, 
A 
Q 
A 
| Q 
Yes. I do. 
Would you indicate who it is? 
It's the defendant sitting at the table over 
MS. HENDRICKSON: Let the record show that the 
indicated Mr. Thomas Huber, seated at the defense 
THE COURT: Record may so show. 
(By Ms. Hendrickson) When you noticed that 
what drew your attention to it? 
The car was in the left-turn lane, facing— 
Which direction was it— 
--facing north. 
It was heading— 
4 J 
1
 A Right. 
2
 Q Okay. 
3
 A On Vine and State. It was revving up its 
4
 engine. 
5 Q What were—is that a, stop light intersection? 
6
 A Yes. It is. 
7
 Q What kind of a stop light series is at that 
8 intersection? 
9 A It has green arrows for the left-turn lanes, 
10 both north and south, and also for through traffic, and— 
11 Q Okay. And he was situated where? 
12 A To make a left turn on to Vine Street to head 
13 westbound. 
14 Q Okay. As you watched the vehicle, would you 
15 describe the events you saw that night? 
16 A The vehicle—I was also stopped at a red light, 
17 along with the Chev. I noticed that—or head him revving 
18 up his engine, I looked over. The light had turned green, 
19 but the vehicle did not go. When the light turned red, 
20 at that time, the vehicle did make a left turn on the red 
21 light. 
22 Q And what was your response to that? 
23 A I pulled the vehicle, over— 
24 Q Okay. 
25 A — f o r making a left turn on a red. 
1 
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10 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
Q 
A 
Vine, or-
Q 
A 
Q 
Where did you pull him over? 
I believe it's in the area of about 35 East 
-
Just past the intersection— 
Right. 
—that you'd gone through? 
Did you have a clear view of the car while you 
were at that stop sign— 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
—at that stop light? 
When you approached the vehicle, was the driver 
still seated? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Okay. And what did you do when you approached 
the vehicle? 
A 
Q 
A 
light. 
Q 
something 
A 
I informed him of the reason for the stop. 
What did you tell him? 
Well, for running th,e—going through the red 
Okay. And what,—in your experience, is this 
that you would normally do? 
Yes. When it was as blatant as that was, I 
always will pull over a car. 
Q Okay. Regardless of whether there's alcohol 
enforcement as your primary— 
6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
9 
10 
11 
A Correct. 
Q —duty? 
A Right, 
Q Okay* You are also watching for vehicle 
infractions, driving infractions; is that also part of 
your position as an alcohol enforcement officer? 
A Yes, It is. 
8
 J Q Okay. As your experience with the Department, 
would your action have been followed by other officers, 
seated there in their vehicle watching that kind of 
vehicle maneuver, from your experience and talking with 
12
 | other officers? 
13
 I A I believe so, yes. 
14
 ' Q When you pulled the person over and approached 
him, what did you notice, when you talked with him? 
A I noticed the strong odor of an alcoholic 
beverage coming from the car and himself. 
Q From the— 
A The driver, I'm sorry. 
Q Okay. Did you notice anything—any other 
physical characteristics about the defendant? 
A While he was sitting in the car, not at that 
time, no. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24
 Q Okay. What kinds of things are you trained in 
25 your position as alcohol enforceraent to look for to perform 
1 your specific duties of alcohol enforcement? 
2 A In driving patterns o r — 
3
 Q Anything that you have to do in your investigation 
4
 stage• 
5 A Well, we always look for the driving pattern, 
6 first, you know, cars driving without headlights or with 
7 their bright lights on or weavinq in the lanes. Odor of 
8 alcohol, their mannerisms, their—you know, when you pull 
9 them over, the physical characteristics. 
10 Q Okay. Did—when you spoke with the defendant, 
11 Mr. Huber, did you notice anything else, besides the odor 
12 of alcohol? 
13 A On Mr. Huber? 
14 Q Uh huh (affirmative). 
15 A While he was still in the car, or when he got 
16 out? 
17 Q While he's still in the car? 
18 A I don't believe so* 
19 Q Okay. When he got out of the car, was that at 
20 your request? 
21 A Yes. It was. 
22 Q Okay. Had you asked, him for identification or a 
23 vehicle registration at that point? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Was he still in the car, or outside the car? 
T 
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4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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23 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
i A 
' Q 
request, 
A 
tests for 
Q 
that you* 
A 
drinking, 
I ask for it when they're in the car. 
Okay. And how did l\e produce that? 
I donft recall any problems. 
Okay. Once he was outside the vehicle, at your 
what did you then do? 
I had Mr. Huber perform some field sobriety 
me. 
How do you initiate that request to someone 
ve stopped? 
Well, I explained to him that since he had been 
I could smell alcohol, that I would perform some 
field sobriety tests, and if I felt he was not impaired, 
he would be released to go on his way. If he's—if I felt 
he was too impaired, then hefd be placed under arrest* I 
Q 
A 
Q 
And how did he respond to your request? 
He performed the tests for me. 
Okay. Was there any, indication given that he 
was not wishing to comply with your request, any behavior? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
I believe 
ask him* 
At that time, no. I 
Okay. Any comments that he made? J 
No. 
Okay. 
He did make a comment that he had been drinking, 
, on my pre-arrest statements when I asked, I did 
9 J 
1
 Q Okay* When you cite somebody for a driving 
2 under the influence charge, what do you normally do on 
3 the traffic violation that you have stopped someone for 
4
 originally? 
5 A We don't issue a citation for that, if it's a 
6
 moving violation, we don't, we just dismiss that for being 
7
 the probable cause for pulling the vehicle over. 
8 Q Okay. Is that what you did in this case? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Okay. How many officer vehicles were at the 
11 scene of the stop? Were you alone? 
12 A Well, originally just mine. I did receive another 
13 back-up unit a short time later. 
14 Q Was that because yon called for one, or is that 
15 just normal procedure? 
16 A It's—for night time, that's normal. 
17 Q Okay. Was the response then initiated at your 
18 request, your call in to the department? 
19 A To have an officer there? 
20 Q Uh huh (affirmative). 
21 A No. 
22 Q Okay. 
23 A Not at that time. 
24 Q What was the—when the other officer responded, 
25 what duties was that officer there to perform? 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A Well, just to make sure that if there's any 
problem, that he's there to assist, and also if the 
driver is placed under arrest, he would be doing the 
impound for me. 
Q Okay. 
MS. HENDRICKSON: I have no further questions 
at this point. 
THE COURT: You may cross. 
MR. LONG: Would your Honor mind if I use the 
podium? 
THii COURT: You nay use the podium. Just—it's 
easier to pull than it is to push. 
MR. LONG: Thanks for the warning. 
| THE COURT: Yeah. It's so heavy that—-
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LONG: 
Q Officer Lmdgren, is it Mark Lxndgren? 
A Art. 
Q Did this happen on the 17th of March or the 19th 
of March? 
A I believe it would be the 19th. 
Q Okay. And this was—you were apparently right 
behind the defendant's vehicle? 
A No. I was off to the right— 
Q Off to the right* 
11 1 
4 
1
 A — o f the car. 
2 Q Were you, like— 
3
 j A I was going to go straight, 
Q You were going to go straight? 
5 A Right. 
6
 Q Oh. I see. So, you were side-by-side, then? 
7 A I believe I was in the middle lane, so I was 
8 over, I believe, a lane. 
9 Q Was there anybody between you a n d — 
10 A I don't believe there was. 
11 Q So, you were the onl^y two at the stop light? 
12 A The best that I recollect, that—I believe 
13 that1 s true. 
14 Q Could you tell if the defendant was aware that 
15 you were there? 
16 A I have no idea if he^ knew I was there or not. 
17 Q Did you meet eye contact with the defendant? 
18 A No. He had another passenger in the car, also, 
19 Q There was? 
20 A I believe there was, yes. 
2! Q Did you meet eye contact with the passenger? 
22 A Not that I recall. 
23 Q Uh huh (affirmative). You were in a marked 
24 vehicle, though? 
25 j A Yes. 
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1
 I Q Uh huh (affirmative),. No other cars on the 
2
 i road? 
3
 I A Well, yeah. I—exactly where they are, I d o n ' t — 
you know, there are other cars on the road, but not with us, 
5
 | I don't believe, at that time, no. 
Q Pretty light traffic, then? 
7
 I A Right at that moment, it was fairly light. 
8 Q Uh huh (affirmative). Okay. So, you say you 
9
 J could tell he was having trouble with the car, gunning it 
and trying t o — 
11
 I A 1 — h e was revving up, his engine as it appeared 
12 he may have been having problems with his car. I fm n o t — 
13 i don't know exactly if he was or not, 
14
 I Q Uh huh (affirmative). And when the light 
turned green for him, the left-hand turn arrow, did the 
car kinda jerk forward, and then stall? 
17
 | A Not that I recall, no. 
18
 I Q Did y o u — w e r e you abJLe to ascertain whether he 
19 I had a standard transmission or an automatic? 
20 A No. 
21 | Q Couldn't tell if he let out on the clutch too 
abruptly and it jerked to a stop? 
23 I A NO. 
24 Q But apparently, he was having trouble with it 
25 before the light even turned green for him? 
13 
15 
16 
22 
1 A That could have been the case, yes. 
2 Q Did that draw your attention to the vehicle? 
3 A It drew my attention over there, right. 
4 Q Uh huh (affirmative). And so how long a period 
5 of time is that arrow green? 
6 A I would assume it varies, depending on how many 
7 cars are behind it, if it keeps triggering the mechanism 
8 ( on the ground, I guess it could stay green for awhile* If 
there's only one car, it wouldn't stay green for very long« 
Q And there was only one car this time, wasn't 
there? 
A Yes. 
Q So, it was green only for a few seconds, then? 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 J A I d o n ' t know how many s e c o n d s . No i d e a . 
15 I Q But i t ' s a v e r y — 
16 A Not very long. I would assume not very long. 
17 J Q Uh huh (affirmative). So, after he finally got 
18 I the engine started, then he just completed the turn? 
19 
20 
21 
A Well, I don't recall it ever dying, but when the 
light turned red—he never did go out to the intersection, 
if that's what you're saying. He was still in the turn 
22 | l a n e . 
23 I Q In t h e l e f t - h a n d turn lane? 
24 A Right. 
25 I Q Uh huh (affirmative),. So when he did make the 
14 
I left turn across the lane, did he interfere with any of 
2
 ' the other traffic? 
A No. 
Q There wasn't any other cars coming, o r — 
A None that had to brake for him, no. 
Q Okay. So, you say that when it is blatant, when 
it is as blatant as that is when you pull somebody over? 
8
 | A Right. 
Q But later, you said that part of the policy of 
the department is that you pull people over for these 
violations, but you never give them a ticket for it? 
12
 | A Not if there's a DUI involved with it, I don't. 
13
 I Q All right. So, in other words, if someone is, 
14 
3 
4 
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6 
7 
9 
10 
11 
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16 
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18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
say, weaving, and you pull them over and check their license, 
ascertain they haven't been drinking, you let them go with 
a warning, you don't give them a ticket for that weaving? 
A No. I don't. 
Q So, in other words, does stopping vehicles for 
weaving, having your headlights out, turning left at a red 
light— 
A Well, no, I don't—it all depends on how blatant 
the violation is. Not every car that I pull over that I 
think may be—the driver may be impaired, I don't always 
let go if they're not, you know, it all depends on what he 
did. I still write citations, I mean if somebody went 
JL5. 
! through a red light and they hadn't been drinking, I'm not 
2 going to let them go •cause they hadn't been drinking. 
3 He'll be issued a citation. 
4 Q Even if there were no other cars on the road? 
5 A Right. Well, not—I can't say I do this every 
6 time, I mean, I don't cite everybody I pull over, no. 
7 Q Uh huh (affirmative). 
8 A Sometimes I let them go with a warning, sometimes 
I cite them. 
U And it depends basically on how—what—your mood 
at the time? 
A Their attitude, the mood, how dangerous the 
violation was. 
Q And you didn't consider this to be a dangerous 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 v io lat ion , did you? 
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A If there was no other traffic immediately coming 
south for them to have to stop, no, it wasn't—wasn't 
dangerous in the sense that there's cars approaching him. 
I mean, they were further back. 
Q Uh huh (affirmative). And so that's why no 
citation was given for the light? 
A No. No citation was given because I approached 
the vehicle and gave him—-could smell alcohol and gave him 
tests, and he was too impaired to be driving, he was 
placed under arrest for DUI. 
16 
1
 Q Right. So, you—when you were asked on direct 
2 examination, you said that you smelled the strong odor of 
3 alcohol and from inside and then you later said, oh, from 
4
 the defendant, I'm sorry; what exactly did you mean when 
5 you said that? 
6 A I don't recall saying oh, I'm sorry, from the 
7 defendant. I said from the defendant and from inside the 
8 vehicle. 
9 Q Now, in your police report, you did fill out a 
10 DUI report form, did you not? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q And on that report, you wrote down under Roman 
13 Numeral VII, physical characteristics, odor of alcoholic 
14 beverage, moderate to strong. And now, you1re testifying 
15 today that it was strong; is that right? 
16 A If—yeah. 
17 Q And in your physical characteristics, Roman 
18 Numeral VII, you didn't put down where the odor was 
19 emanating from, the vehicle or the person, but now it's 
20 your testimony that it would be emanating from both the 
21 vehicle and the defendant. 
22 A Well, when he stepped out of his car, it was 
23 still there, it was coming from him, and just not the 
24 vehicle. 
25 Q But when he was in the car, you couldn't really 
17 
1 tell if it was coming from him or just inside the vehicle? 
2 A I could detect an alcoholic beverage, yes, from--
3 Q But you couldn't tell whether it was coming 
4 from him or the vehicle? 
5 A Not until later. 
6 U Right. And so while he was still sitting in his 
7 car, the only clue you had that he had been drinking was 
8 the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from somewhere 
9 inside the vehicle; is that correct? 
10 A That's right. 
11 Q Okay. Now, you said he had no trouble getting 
12 his license out, or registration? 
13 A No. 
14 Q And when he got out of the vehicle, that's the 
15 point at which you then smelled the odor coming from his 
16 person, when he got out? 
17 A At some point after he got out, I did, yes. 
18 Q At some point. And that's when you asked him to 
19 submit to the field sobriety tests? 
20 A Well, I believe I also asked him if he had been 
21 drinking and which he told me he had. 
22 Q Uh huh (affirmative)• And that was one of t h e — 
23 Y o u said, the pre-arrest statements? 
24 A Right. 
25 Q He said he'd been drinking* Could you tell what 
18 
1
 kind of an alcoholic beverage you smelled? 
2
 A No. 
3
 Q Do you drink? 
4 
A I have, in the past, yes. 
5
 Q And so you couldn't tell the difference between 
6
 beer and Vodka, say? 
7
 A That's pretty—it's difficult after they've been 
8
 drinking. They pretty much all smell alike unless it's a 
9
 Bourbon or something, and then there might be another smell 
10 to it, but no, I'd say it's pretty tough to distinguish 
11 exactly what kind of alcohol is in their system or what 
12 they've been drinking. 
13 Q Well, when he was sitting in the car, was the 
14
 odor of the alcoholic beverage emanating from the vehicle, 
15
 was it moderate or strong? 
16
 A While he was in the car? 
17
 Q Uh huh (affirmative). 
18
 A It was—it was pretty strong. 
19
 Q And so then when he got out of the car, what 
20
 would be the odor of the alcoholic beverage from his 
21 person? How was that? 
22 A Well, you're not inside an enclosed area anymore. 
23 it was, you know, diminished, it wasn't as strong as when 
24 he was sitting in the car. 
25 Q Uh huh (affirmative). And there was a passenger 
19 
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with him, was there not? 
A Yes* 
Q And were you able to ascertain who that 
passenger was? 
A I didnft get his information, no. 
Q Uh huh (affirmative). Now, you also wrote down 
in—there fs another person named Michael Anthony, is that 
somebody who was a witness to this? 
A A Michael Anthony? 
Q Uh huh (affirmative). 
A 
figured 
I don't have my repojrt form. I don1 
we were just going 
so I didn't have—I really 
Michael Anthony's in there t 
donft know. I j u s t — 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
There was no one 
No. 
No other officer 
t ~ I 
to go through the traffic stop 
didn't look through it. If 
r it may be the passenger, I 
with you, no other 
came as a back-up? 
Yes. There was one. 
Do you know when 
After, I believe 
he arrived? 
he arrived after I 
performing the tests on the driver. 
Q 
A 
Could you tell me whp that was? 
Like I said, I didn't go through the 
I figured we were just going to go through the 
20 
officer? 
started 
report form. 
traffic stop, 
1 so I don't recall, without going through my report* 
2 Q You have no independent recollection of who the 
3 officer was? 
4
 A Not that night with that DUI, no, I'd have to 
5 go through my report to find out who it was. 
6 Q And you don't remember when he arrived? 
7 A I said some time during the tests, I don't know 
8 exactly the time. 
9 Q Do you know if he was a witness to some of the 
10 tests? 
11 A I believe he was. 
12 Q Do you know if he filed a supplemental report? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Do you know if he took any notes as to the field 
15 sobriety tests? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Okay. So, in Chapter—or Chapter 7# In Paragraph 
18 Roman Numeral VII at the bottom of your DUI report form 
19 under physical characteristics, you wrote down under speech, 
20 no problems? 
21 A That's right. 
22 Q And then you wrote dpwn, and I presume that the 
23 odor of the alcoholic beverage and the speech were written 
24 down at some later time, such a s — I guess you started 
25 filling this out at five minutes to midnight? 
21 
6 
7 
10 
11
 A If that's what it says on the report, yes. 
2
 I k &n& you finished filling it out at 1:30; is that 
3I correct? 
4
 ' A Right. 
5
 | U The next morning? Okay, And so then after he 
did get out of the car, you wrote that he had a little 
difficulty walking a straight line? 
8 | A Right. 
Q Is that right? And were there any signs or 
complaints of injury or illness? 
11 I A No. 
12
 U Were there any other physical characteristics you 
13 can remember? 
14
 I A Not that comes offhand. Like I said, I really 
didn't go in ,to my report, because I figured we were just 
going to be stopping about the stop and not the entire DUI* 
17
 I Q But you have no independent recollection of any 
18
 other physical characteristics? 
19
 I A He had a hard time getting his boots off. I don't 
know if that's physical or what. As to bloodshot eyes, like 
21 I I said, I didn't go through the report, so I don't recall 
22
 if I wrote that in or not. 
23 U Okay. Is it—could you tell us about the 
24 horizontal gaze Nystagmus test you did on the defendant? 
25 A Tell you about it? 
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Q I mean, could you describe—did you do one, 
first? 
A Yes. 
Q And do you remember how you conducted the test? 
A Yes. 
Q How did you do it? 
A I held a flashlight below the subject's face, 
not too much—to put too much of a glare on him, just 
enough so that I could see, and then moved a pen in front 
of their eyes about a foot or so, and tell them to keep 
their head straight and to follow the pen with their eyes 
only. 
Q Uh huh (affirmative). And this was done while 
he was standing outside of his vehicle? 
A Right. 
Q Okay. And do you remember how he performed on 
those tests—on that test? 
A Yes. He had both unsmooth pursuit of the pen, 
which is one of the things we're looking for in people who 
have been drinking, and also, when the eyes are out at the 
maximum deviation, or as far as they can go, he—his eyes 
were jerking, or had good Nystagmus there. 
Q Uh huh (affirmative),. And is that all you can 
recall about it, then? 
A Yes. 
-23-
1 Q Since this was late at night, did you take into 
2 consideration anything in terms of it being late at night? 
3 A What—I don't understand what you're saying. 
4
 Q Did you adjust it in terms of the fact that it 
5 was late at night? 
6 A Adjust what? 
7 Q Any of the way you view the test, in terms of, say,| 
8 the number of degrees at which t h e — 
9 I A No, you don't adjust; the test for day or night. 
10 Q So, you don't make any adjustments f o r — 
11 A There is no adjustments to make. You move the 
12 pen, you know, and see how they follow it. I mean, 
13 there's nothing to adjust. 
14 Q But in—where you did your training, they didn't 
15 tell you that fatigue, muscle fatigue on the eyes has 
16 something to do with gaze Nystagmus? 
17 A No. 
18 Q They d idn ' t ? So, you d i d n ' t make any adjustments? 
19 A No. 
20 Q And do you remember what other field sobriety 
21 tests you did for the defendant? 
22 A I gave the heel-to-toe, and the one-leg stand. 
23 U Could you tell us how he did on the heel-to-toe? 
24 A If I could look at my notes, I can tell you. 
25 They're at the desk. Like I said, I didn't expect to be 
24 
1 going through the entire DUI part of it. 
2 Q But you have no independent recollection of how 
3 he did on that? 
4
 A I do so many, I don't reqall without going 
5 through the notes. 
6 U And the same with the one-leg stand? 
7 A No. 
8 Q You do remember how he did on that? 
9 A I know he used—he put his foot down, but I 
10 don't recall how many times, or exactly what he—how he 
11 did on that, no. 
12 Q Was he still wearing his boots at the time? 
13 A No. He took his boots off. 
14 Q So, he was barefooted? 
15 A Right. 
16 Q And v/here was the t e s t conducted? 
17 A In a parking l o t . 
18 Q And v/as there gravel
 f or anything like that? 
19 A Nothing that was—it was pretty smooth. 
20 Q Concrete or asphalt? 
21 A It was asphalt. 
22 Q can you tell me where the parking lot is? 
23 A It's in the business, around 35 East Vine. 
24 Q Which side of the road would it be on? 
25 A It would be the north side. 
25 
1
 Q You don't remember the business, though, that 
2 was there? 
3
 A No* I don't remember the business. 
4
 Q Do you remember ar^ other field sobriety tests? 
5 A I believe I gave him also the hand-slap. 
6
 Q Do you remember how Jhte performed on that? 
7
 A Yes. I believe I put down that he had double 
8 pats, and then he slowed down and did a little better, I 
9 believe is what I wrote dov/n on that one. 
10 C And how about the finger-count? Did you do that 
11 test? 
12 A I don't recall if I gave that one or not. 
13 Q So, you don't know how he performed on the 
14 finger-count test? 
15 A If I gave it to him, I don't recall, no. 
16 Q Could you tell us how his ability was to follow 
17 the instructions? 
!8 A I don't believe he had any problems following 
19 the instructions, no. 
20 Q Okay. And you searched his person, did you? 
21 A At the police station—oh, yeah. No, it was 
22 there, I believe I searched him, yes, I did. 
23 Q And you searched him, yourself? 
24 A Right. 
25 Q And what d i d t h e back-up o f f i c e r do? 
26 
1 A The impound. 
2 Q All right. So, he was busy impounding the vehicle 
3 while you were searching the person of the defendant, or 
4 do you remember the sequence of events? 
5 A I, after I arrested him, I looked through the car 
6 real quick and then searched him. 
7 Q And did you then take him to jail? 
8 A Took him to the police station. 
9 I Q Uh huh (affirmative). And when you took him to 
10 I the police station, what happened there? 
n A I read him the first admonition, first, I checked 
12 I inside his mouth after I cuffed him, then I took him to the 
13 I police station, then I read him the first admonition as to 
14 whether or not he'd take a breath test. 
15 I Q And so, let's see, you say you cuffed him and 
16 then you checked in his mouth, is that the way? 
17 A Right. 
18 Q And did you search his person before you 
19 I handcuffed him, I presume, or did you handcuff him— 
A No. I cuffed him first, and then I searched 
him. 
20 
21 
22 Q So, you then handcuff and then you search him 
23 
24 
and then you look in his mouth and then you put him in the 
police car? 
25 A No. I cuffed him, then £ looked in his mouth. 
27 
U Oh. Okay, So, you looked in his mouth, last? 
A Looked in his mouth first, and then I searched 
him. I cuffed him, looked in his mouth and then I searched 
him. 
Q I see. And then when you took him to the police 
station, what happened there? 
A I read him this first admonition as to whether 
8
 J or not he*d take the breath test. 
Q And what was his response? 
A Oh, he said he would take it. 
Q And did you then conduct the test? 
A Yes. 
U And did you have any, difficulties with the test? 
A No. 
Q And did you have occasion to make a printout of 
the test results? 
A Yes. 
<u And what were those? 
A I believe it was a ..16, or somewhere in that 
area. 
it And did you calibrate the machine before you 
ran the test? 
A Yes. 
Q And did you make a checklist of the things you 
followed when you ran the breathalyzer, or the intoxilyzer? 
-M-
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
itself; 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. I did. 
And did you keep a copy of it? 
Yes. 
And do you have a copy of it? 
Yes. 
Hay I see it? 
It's on the desk. 
So, there was no difficulties with the machine, 
is that correct? 
No. No difficulties^ no. 
And you did follow the Eaker rule? 
Yes. 
And how many minutes, did you wait after you 
looked in his mouth before you did the test? 
A 
exactly 
looking. 
Q 
A 
further 
I always wait at least 16 to 17. I don't know 
how many minutes I waited on this one, without 
Is the Baker rule 15 minutes? 
Yes. It is. 
MR. LONG: Okay. I don't believe I have any 
questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank yo.u. 
Your motion to suppress is based upon the fact 
that you felt that there was not probable cause to make the 
stop; is t that right? 
29 J 
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1
 MR. LONG: Well, I have—there are two basic 
2
 arguments, your Honor, Ifve kind of developed since 
3
 I Judge Billings wrote the decision in the Sierra case last 
May and then reaffirmed it in February 15th with the 
5 Auroro case, and then there's another case that just came 
6
 out last week from the Supreme Court, where Judge Stewart 
7
 wrote the majority opinion and two of the other judges 
8 agreed with him, and Justice Kail and one of the other 
9 justices disagreed, but I think itfs very enlightening in 
10 terms of the situation where—that we're looking at here 
n today. 
12 THE COURT: Is there any more testimony you want 
13 from this witness? 
*
4
 MS. HLNDRICKSON: Perhaps just to clarify a couple 
15 of the question areas that were covered on cross-
16
 examination* 
*
7
 THE COURT: You may redirect. 
18
 MS* HENDRICKSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
19 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
20 BY MS. HENDRICKSON: 
21 Q Officer Lindgren, at the outset of your cross-
22 examination testimony, there was some discussion of the 
23 actual date of the offense. I had asked you if you'd been 
24 on duty the night of the 17th of March, and whether your 
25 attention had been drawn to this blue Chevrolet, you said 
JUL 
4 
1 yes* When you were asked on cross-examination, the dates 
2 of the 19th and 20th were brought up. As I have looked at 
3 J every report form that you signed, I see the 17th— 
MR. LONG: Your Honor, I think that's a leading 
5 question, and it's been asked and answered. 
6 THE COURT; Sustained. 
7 Q (Ey Ms. Hendrickson) Do you recall the date of 
8 the offense that you wrote on your report was the 17th? 
9 A Do I recall if it was the 17th? 
10 Q Yes. 
)) A Like, I thought you told—I thought you said it 
12 was the 19th. That's why I said yes. Like I said— 
13 Q Perhaps I just mispronounced# but it was the 
14 17th that I asked you. 
15 MR. LONG: A leading question, your Honor9 
16 MS. HENDRICKSON: Excuse me. 
17 THE COURT: Sustained. 
18 MS* HENDRICKSON: We 111 withdraw the question. 
19 Q (By Ms. Hendrickson) You stated on the night in 
20 question when you stopped this defendant, you were at a 
21 traffic light and the traffic was light. Now, based upon 
22 that, is there any regulation or law that you can think of 
23 that would permit a turn on a red light, that would be 
24 appropriate under those circumstances? 
25 A No. 
31 
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 Q When you heard the engine being revved, you 
2 I 
didn't, at any time, notice the car come to a stop or the 
3 
engine stop, or stall? 
4 I 
A No, I don't recall it ever stopping. 
5
 I Q Okay. What ultimately drew your attention to the 
vehicle, besides the revving engine, that caught your 
attention at first? What ultimately— 
8
 MK. LONG: Asked and answered, your Honor. 
9
 I THE COURT: Sustained• 
Q (By Ms. Hendrickson) In your training as an 
alcohol enforcement officer, what have you been instructed 
to do or consider when you smell the odor of alcohol 
emanating from a vehicle, where there is a person still 
seated there, in the vehicle? 
A What are my instructions to do? 
Q What do^you do? What have you been trained to do? 
A What I do, I usually ask them if they have been 
drinking, and after that, I ask them to step out of the 
car to perform some field tests for me. 
Q Has your training taught you that there's some 
21
 J distinction as to whether the odor's coming from the 
!
 vehicle or from the person at the initial investigatory 
23
 I stop? 
24
 A There's some—I'm sorry. bay that once more 
28
 Q When the person is first stopped and seated still 
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 in their vehicle, at the investigation stage, are you 
2 particularly concerned at that tiiae whether the odor of 
3
 J alcohol is coming from the person or from the vehicle? 
A I will still bring them out and do the tests, 
5 whether itfs coming from the car or the person. 
6
 Q And why is that that you would do that? 
7
 A I very seldom get an honest answer as to whether 
8 they've been drinking, and just to make sure that they 
9 hadn't been or if they're capable of driving. 
10 Q Okay. All of these occurrences that you've 
11 stated, they occurred while you were on duty in Murray; 
12 is that correct? 
13 A Right. 
14 g Okay. 
15 MS. H2NDRICKS0N: I have no further questions. 
16 THE COURT: Any further cross? 
17 MR. LONG: No further recross, your Honor. 
18
 TKK COURT: You may step down, Officer. Thank you. 
19 City have any other witnesses? 
20 KS. HENDRICKSON: No, your Honor. 
21 THL, COURT: Okay. Do you have any argument, 
22
 Mr. Long? 
23 M R . LONG: If your Honor doesn't mind, I think 
24 it's kind of enlightening, it seems like the law is so dull 
25 and it seens to be kind of perking up here, if you don't 
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J mind, Ifd like to say a few words about ny—what I think 
the trend in the law has been* Do you mind? 
THxi COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. LONG: Well, I, ^ o be v^ uite honest, when I 
read the Sierra case last year, I thought it was just a 
flash in the pan and I thought the Supreme Court was going 
to end up saying, that's too bad, but Judge Billings 
reaffirmed this opinion in May 15th—or on February 15th, 
this year, with the Auroro case, which rather surprised me. 
And then last week, we had this case come down, which I 
heard about on the radio and went up to the Supreme Court 
Law Library and picked up a copy, which I got this morning. 
The State of Utah vs. Schollser and Lowder, I don't know 
if your Honor is familiar with it, it was entered on 
May 17th, and it was written by Justice Stewart, Steve 
McCaughey and Loni DeLand were the two attorneys tor the 
defense, and I thought I might ;just run through the facts 
because they're so—so close to this case that I think it's 
very, very enlightening. 
Officer Howard of the Utah Highway Patrol clocked 
a pickup truck traveling 42 miles per hour in a 30-mile-
per-hour zone in Nephi, Utah, and signaled the vehicle to 
pull over. As the vehicles were pulling over, Officer 
24
 Howard observed defendant Schollser, a passenger in the 
25 vehicle, bending forward, acting fidgety, turning to the 
3JL 
left and to the right and turning back to look at the 
officer. 
After stopping the vehicle, the driver, defendant 
Lowder, got out of the truck and met Officer Howard between 
the truck and the patrol car, with a valid driver's 
license and vehicle registration, ready to show the 
officer. Very similar to testimony as to what Mr. Huber 
did. 
Schollser continued to move about in the cab of 
the truck. Defendant's behavior led the officer to 
conclude that Schollser was trying to hide something. 
Officer Howard approached the passenger side of the 
vehicle, tapped on the closed window, immediately opened 
the passenger door and asked Schollser for identification. 
Officer Hov/ard testified that he asked for identification 
as a pretext for trying to determine what Schollser may 
have been hiding. 
Upon opening the door, Officer Howard scanned the 
interior of the truck for contraband and saw a baggie of 
marijuana in the passenger door pocket, which apparently 
was in plain sight. He also sraelled marijuana smoke. 
The defendants were arrested, and in a subsequent 
search of the vehicle, additional bags of marijuana, drugs, 
et cetera, and two unloaded firearms were also found. 
They were charged with unlawful possession of controlled 
35 
1 substance. 
2 Now, on defendants motion, the trial court, 
3 which is Judge Harding who is a very conservative judge, 
4
 granted the motion of the defendant to suppress all of the 
5 evidence seized* 
6
 In ruling on the motion, the trial court found 
7 that Officer Howard acted on a mere suspicion that the 
8 defendant, Gchollser was engaged in criminal activity, had 
9 no legal basis for the search and seizure, and ordered the 
10 evidence taken from the automobile suj^ressed, 
11 This is, you know, really quite fresh off the 
12 press, and it was a three-to-two decision, but we are, 
13 hopefully, bound by the precedents, which are set by our 
14 Supreme Court, and t h i s — 
15 THU COURT: That's referring to the passenger, 
16 though, isn't it? 
17 MR. LONG: Well, but I think it's indicative of 
18 the fact that he smelled marijuana smoke, saw a bag of 
19 marijuana in plain view in the car, o r — 
20 THE COURT: But the initial stop wasn't anything 
21 to do, other than speeding. 
22 MR. LONG: Right. 
23 THE COURT: Yeah, 
24 MR. LONG: Right. 
25 THE COURT: And the only thing that drew the 
36 
1 attention of the officer to the passenger was his wiggling 
2 around. 
3 MR. LONG: Well, that's true, but I mean just the 
4 fact that he smelled marijuana smoke and saw a bag in plain 
5 sight, of narijuana. 
6 THU COURT: But after the wiggling around, was 
7 after he—the only reason he approached the car in the 
8 first place is 'cause the—i*as the action of the passenaer 
9 J in the car, not anything obvious as far as a violation to 
the officer. 
MR. LONG: Right, And in this case, we have even 
less of a reason for the officer—the officer testified that 
even if he smells the odor of alcohol emanating from the 
14 | vehicle, he still has the defendant get out and perform 
15 | field sobriety tests. 
16 I THii COURT: So, are you saying that there was a 
17 legitimate stop because he run a red light? 
18 MR. LONG: Kell, I'm saying that his testimony 
19 was that it's departmental policy to look for people who 
20 I are making minor traffic violations; weaving on the road, 
21 | driving with their headlights off, turning left at a 
22 I red light, and after they stop them, if it's not dangerous 
10 
n 
12 
13 
23 and in his somewhat arbitrary decision, he decides it wasn't 
24 I a blatant violation, he just lets them go. But if he 
25 smells the odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle, not the 
37 
1
 person, he has them get out, makes then do field sobriety 
2
 tests. 
10 
11 
13 
14 
Now, I think that is the pretext that the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals is getting at. That's the 
very thing. - I mean, if he says, well, he blatantly made a 
.left-hand turn at a red light and I had to pull him over to 
give him a ticket, and here's the ticket for turning at a 
8 I red light, and incident to that, I also discovered that I 
9
 I smelled the odor of alcohol coming from his breath and I 
then, you know, went through the other routine, I could see 
it; but as a departmental policy, they have now to pull 
12 | people over for weaving, for doing other minor traffic 
violations, with no intention of giving them a ticket for 
the violation, but just to ascertain whether they've been 
15
 J drinking• 
16 l
 And as I say, itfs impossible, really, to read 
17
 j the minds of the Supreme Court Justices and the Court of 
Appeals Justices, but I do think that the trend has been, 
and I'm quite surprised, myself, as of last week, that the 
trend has been to try to stop what they consider to be 
pretext stops, and pretext searches of people incident to 
these stops for minor traffic violations for which they 
23 j have no intention of giving them a ticket. 
I think his testimony, you know, as we went through 
some of his testimony there, he was—he said, first, it 
aa. 
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1
 was a strong odor of alcohol, then we found out it was 
2 coming from the vehicle. On his report, he wrote down 
3
 I later, it was moderate to strong, and he didn't mention 
where it came from. There was no problems with his speech, 
5 he wrote it on the report. Go, before he got out of the 
6
 vehicle, the only hint he had that the guy had been 
7
 drinking v/as the odor of alcohol enanating from within the 
8 vehicle, that's it, other than perhaps the pre-arrest 
9 statement he nay have made, which we don't know what tine 
10 he made it, that he had been drinking, we don't know when 
11 that statement was made. Dut I just don't see that that's 
12 really probable cause to give someone field sobriety tests 
13 when that's all you've got to go on, unless, as he 
n mentioned earlier, he is on alcohol enforcement, that's 
15 the name of his shift, that's his job is to go out and 
16 arrest people for violating alcohol ordinances, and they're 
17 just using the weaving and no headlights and that sort of 
18
 thing as a pretext to pull people over to check them out, 
19 see if they've been drinking. 
20 If they smell the odor of alcohol coming from the 
21 vehicle and not the person, they make them get out of the 
22 car and do the field sobriety tests* 
23 In terms of the Baker rule, I would point out 
24 that in the DUI report form, the vehicle was—or the 
25 person was searched at 45 minutes, at 2345, quarter to 
21. 
1 midnight and the test was run at one minute to midnight, 
2 that's only 14 minutes, so I'd say the Baker rule was 
3 violated, and the intoxilyzer results should be suppressed 
4 due to that. 
5 tfHE COURT: Do you wish to respond? 
6 MS. HiSHDIilCKSON: Yes, your Honor. 
7 We don't object to the defense counsel 
8 referencing State vs. Sierra. That case indicated that a 
9 minor violation, a mere hunch is not to be the basis for 
10 something that's inappropriate. 
11 We heard testimony from Officer Lindgren that it 
12 was not a mere hunch. He was stopping the vehicle which 
13 had run a red light. He testified that his training 
14 indicates that he does have discretion to make stops, but 
15 seeing a clear violation of running a red light is 
16 something that he and other reasonable officers would 
17 follow up on. 
18 Based upon initially having a good reason to 
19 stop someone, he then indicated, no, I don't write traffic 
20 citations when, what I find, based on the probable cause 
21 of the stop for the traffic violation, I then find that 
22 there is obvious indication that there may be alcohol 
23 involved, and he indicated that that was the case, when 
24 the person had a strong odor of alcohol about him, plus he 
25 said he had been drinking, in the pre-arrest statements. 
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1 So, he indicated that based on the totality of 
2 the circumstance assessment, that the traffic stop was 
3 just something that he would have done anyway, but when he 
4 was faced with the evidence of strong odor of alcohol, he 
5 could not ignore that because that is his training as an 
6 alcohol enforcement officer* 
7 I don't believe that what we've had the officer 
8 describe is a mere hunch, and also, as the cases have 
9 pointed out, the issue of traffic stops resulting in a 
10 further citation, the courts look at v/hether a reasonable 
11 officer standard applies to rhe initial stop, and then also 
12 a consideration of the totality of the circumstances and 
13 every case becomes fact specific* 
14 And in this case, the facts, of course, are 
15 different from any of these others that defense counsel 
16 has mentioned, and so I think that we should look to the 
17 facts of this case. 
18 TEE COURT: Well, the Court's going to deny the 
19 motion to suppress. I think the officerf in observing the 
20 left turn on a red light has probable cause to stop the 
21 defendant. It's not quite the same as an officer stopping 
22 someone who he observes weaving, 
23 I have a lot of cases in this Court of running 
24 red lights, I don't get any cases of weaving* It's a — 
25 weaving usually is one of the things the officer will 
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j consider when he makes a stop, when he thinks a person's 
driving under the influence. Weaving, within a several 
block area, he'll count the number of times the officer— 
or the vehicle driving by the defendant may have left the 
lane as he weaved from one side of the lane to the other, 
and if there were any other types of traffic irregularities, 
but to run a red light is certainly a—not an unusual 
stop; in fact, we get a lot of red lights. 
And so once the officer has a reasonable, 
articulable reasons for making the otop, then he then has 
the right upon observing or ascertaining the odor of 
alcohol, to carry on with an investigation, and I find that 
here, in this case, the officer just did that. 
I—as X listen to your argument, ilr. Long, the 
new cases coming down, I don't think they're new at all, I 
mean they're just—and I don't think it's going in a new 
direction at all. This State has beun, has become, since 
they have been arresting the people with the drugs going 
through Central-Southern Utah, both in the Federal Courts 
and the State Courts, have become more aware of the need for 
a legitimate probable cause or reasonable, articulable 
reason for stopping the defendant's car. 
It doesn't even need to go quite to the—as to the 
24
 standard of probable cause to make a legitimate and a lawful 
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25 stop, but you—well, I think the last one I just read from 
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1 the Supreme Court where the officers followed the guy for 
2 some 40 miles, talking to each other, waiting for the 
3 defendant to make some type of illegal action so that they 
4 could finally stop him, and then finally stopped him 
5 because he drove 20 miles in the left fast lane instead of 
6 the right slower lane, never exceeding the speed limit, 
7 which meant that they were aware of the Supreme Court's 
8 decisions, both Federal and State, and they were looking 
9 for probable cause to stop this vehicle that had out-of-
10 state license plates. And when the driver didn't give them 
n anything, they arrested him for traveling too slow in the 
12 fast lane, and the Court threw it out. 
13 I read thi3 case that you're talking about with 
14 Judge Harding, and it didn't seem that it opens up a new 
15 area at all. Here's a passenger, sitting in a car, not 
16 doing anything except moving around in the seat. They 
17 didn't say we were worried that he had a gun, that he was 
18 going to threaten us or shoot us. The initial stop had been 
19 made with the driver for speeding, they could have ticketed 
20 the driver, which would have ordinarily occurred, and then 
21 it would have gone on its way. And then they approached 
22 the passenger side, and I think you said the officer 
23 admitted that he used the ruse of just to go open the door. 
24 I He was just in a fishing expedition, he didn't have any 
25 reason to go up there and open that door. 
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And so this whole area has been established a 
long time ago, this is just a new way of saying it, and so 
I'm—1 don't think we're talking about a new area* 
The Court's going to find there's probable cause 
to proceed with this case* How, I'll oeny your motion to 
suppress. 
You haven't mentioned the motion to dismiss on 
anything other than that. I'm not going to rule on your 
motion to suppress the breathalyzer, or the—based upon 
the Baker rule, until such time as tlus testimony is taken 
at trial, and then we can determine whether or not the 
standards of the Baker rule have been met. 
The officer here didn't bring his notes, he said 
he just thought the stop was what was—and I don't feel 
that this is the proper time to rule on whether or n o t — 
whether the Baker rule has been observed. 
This Court will note—just let me check here. 
We'll have to set this for—is there going to be any plea 
bargain? I think everybody knows about the case, we've 
had this set for a pretrial hearing betore, and then so we 
continued the pretrial hearing until today for this motion• 
Mb* HLNDK1CKSON: I would have no objection if 
defense counsel wished to meet and discuss the potential 
for discussing the elements of the case as they now stand. 
THIS COURT: Wel l , l e t ' s s e e , t he p r e t r i a l hea r ing 
-<H-
4 
1 is today, our next pretrial hearing will be June 6th, and 
2 we'll continue the raatter to June the 6th at 2:00 p.m. for 
3 I pretrial hearing. 
ME. HLNDRICKSON: Thank you, your Eonor. 
5 I TE^ COUIVT: Court's in recess for five minutes. 
6
 | {Uh^reut'On, this hearing was concluded.) 
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§ 18-36 Murray City Code § 18-38 
(2) Such exemption shall apply only when the driver 
of such vehicle, while in motion, sounds audible signal by 
bell, siren or exhaust whistle as may be reasonably necessary 
and when the vehicle is equipped with at least one lighted 
lamp displaying a red tight visible under normal atmospheric 
conditions from a distance of five hundred feet to the front 
of such vehicle, 
(3) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the 
driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to 
drive with due regard for the safety of others, nor shall 
such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of 
an arbitrary exercise of the privileges granted in this sec-
tion. (Ord. No. 806, § 1.) 
Sec. 18-36. Authority of real property owner to regulate 
traffic on own property. Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to prevent the owner of real property used by the 
public for purposes of vehicular travel by permission of the 
owner and not as a matter of right from prohibiting such use 
or from requiring other or different or additional conditions 
than those specified in this chapter or otherwise regulating 
such use as may seem best to such owner. (Ord. No. 806, § 
1.) 
9. For similar state law, see U.C.A. 
1953, § 41-6-18. 
Article III. Traffic Administration 1 
For state law as to powers of lo-
cal authorities relative to traf-
fic regulations, see U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 41-6-17. As to power of local 
authorities to place and maintain 
traffic-control devices, see 
U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-22. 
Sec. 18-37. Duties of police department generally. It 
shall be the duty of the police department to enforce the 
traffic regulations of this city and all of the state vehicle 
laws applicable to street traffic in this city, to make ar-
rests for traffic violations, to investigate accidents, to 
develop ways and means to improve traffic conditions and to 
carry out those duties specifically imposed by the ordinances 
of this city. (Ord. No. 806, § I.) 
Sec. 18-38. Repealed and not replaced. 
(Murray 1/85) 156.22 
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Sec. 18-44. Authority to prohibit stopping, standing and 
parking in hazardous or congested places. The chief of po-
lice is hereby authorized to determine and designate by pro-
per signs places in which the stopping, standing or parking 
of vehicles would create an especially hazardous condition or 
would cause unusual delay to traffic. (Ord. No. 806, § 1.) 
2 
Article IV. Traffic-Control Devices. 
2. For state law as to traffic signs, 
signals and markings, see U.C.A., 
1953, §§ 41-6-20 to 41-6-28. 
Sec. 18-45. Obedience to devices required. No driver of a 
vehicle shall disobey the instruction of any traffic-control 
device placed in accordance with the provisions of this chap-
ter, unless at the time he is otherwise directed by a police 
officer or subject to the exceptions granted the driver of an 
authorized emergency vehicle in this chapter. (Ord. No. 806, 
§ 1.) 
3. For similar state law, see U.C.A., 
1953, § 41-6-23. 
4 
Sec. 18-46. Traffic-control signal legend. Whenever traf-
fic is controlled by a traffic-control signal exhibiting dif-
ferent colored lights, or color lighted arrows, successively 
one at a time or in combination only the colors green, red, 
and yellow shall be used, except for special pedestrian sig-
nals carrying a word legend and said lights shall indicate 
and apply to drivers of vehicles and pedestrians as follows: 
(1) "Green" indication. 
(A) Vehicular traffic facing a circular green sig-
nal may proceed straight through or turn right or left unless 
a sign at such place prohibits either such turn. But vehicu-
lar traffic, including vehicles turning right or left, shall 
yield the right-of-way to other vehicles and to pedestrians 
lawfully within the intersection or an adjacent crosswalk at 
the time such signal is exhibited. 
(B) Vehicular traffic facing a green arrow signal 
shown alone or in combinarion with other indication, may cau-
tiously enter the intersection only to make the movement in-
dicated by such arrow or such other movement as is permitted 
by other indications shown at the same time. Such vehicular 
traffic shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully 
within an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic lawfully 
using the intersection. 
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(C) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-
control signal as provided in section 18-47, pedestrians fac-
ing any green signal except when the sole green signal is a 
turn arrow may proceed across the roadway within any marked 
or unmarked crosswalk. 
(2) Steady "yellow" indication. 
(A) Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular 
yellow or yellow arrow signal is thereby warned that the 
"red" signal will be exhibited immediately thereafter and 
such vehicular traffic shall not enter the intersection when 
the "red" signal is exhibited. 
(B) Pedestrians facing a steady circular yellow or 
yellow arrow signal, unless otherwise directed by a pedes-
trian-control signal as provided in section 18-47 are thereby 
advised that there is insufficient time to cross the roadway, 
before a red indication is shown and no pedestrians shall 
then start to cross the roadway. 
(3) Steady "red" indication. 
(A) Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal 
alone shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, 
before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the inter-
section, or if none, then before entering the intersection 
and shall remain standing until an indication to proceed is 
shown; except as provided in subsection (3) (C) of this sec-
tion. 
(B) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-
control signal as provided in section 18-47, pedestrians fac-
ing a steady red signal alone shall not enter the roadway. 
(C) Except when a sign is in place prohibiting a 
turn, vehicular traffic facing any steady red signal may cau-
tiously enter the intersection to turn right, or may turn 
left from a one-way street into a one-way street, after stop-
ping as required by subsection (3)(A) of this section. Such 
vehicular traffic shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians 
lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic 
lawfully using the intersection. 
(4) If an official traffic-control signal is erected 
and maintained at a place other than an intersection, the 
provisions of this section shall be applicable except as to 
those provisions which by their nature can have no applica-
tion. Any stop required shall be made at a sign or marking 
on the highway pavement indicating where the stop shall be 
156.25 (Murray 1/85) 
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made; but in the absence of any such sign or marking the stop 
shall be made at the signal. (Ord. No. 806, § 1.) 
4. For similar state law, see U.C.A., 
1953, § -41-6-24. 
Sec. 18-47. Pedestrian "walk" and "don't walk" signals. 
Whenever special pedestrian control signals exhibiting the 
words "walk," "wait" or "don't walk" are in place and operat-
ing, such signals shall indicate and govern pedestrians as 
follows: 
(1) "Walk." Pedestrians facing such signal may pro-
ceed across the roadway in the direction of the signal and 
shall be given the right-of-way by the drivers of all ve-
hicles. 
(2) "Wait" or "don't walk." No pedestrians shall 
start to cross the roadway in the direction of such signal, 
but any pedestrian who has partially completed his crossing 
on the "walk" signal shall proceed to the nearest sidewalk or 
safety zone while the "wait" or "don't walk" signal is show-
ing and remain there until the "walk" signal is shown alone. 
(Ord. No. 806, § 1.) 
5. For similar state law, see U.C.A., 
1953, § 41-6-25. 
Sec. 18-48. Flashing signals. (a) Whenever an illumi-
nated flashing red or yellow signal is used in a traffic-
control device, it shall require obedience by traffic as fol-
lows: 
(1) Flashing red (stop signal). When a red lens is 
illuminated by rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehi-
cles shall stop at the stop line when marked or, if none, 
then before entering the nearest crosswalk whether painted or 
not, and if none, then before entering the intersection, and 
the right to proceed shall be subject to the rules applicable 
after marking a stop at a stop sign. 
(2) Flashing yellow (caution signal). When a yel-
low lens is illuminated with rapid intermittent flashes, 
drivers of vehicles may proceed through the intersection or 
past such signal only with caution. 
(3) Pedestrians crossing roadways. Pedestrians 
facing a flashing red or yellow signal may proceed to cross 
the roadway in a crosswalk only after ascertaining that it is 
safe to do so and then only with due caution. Drivers of 
vehicles shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully 
crossing a roadway at such intersection. 
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AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the se-
curity of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to hav 
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his*^*' 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his d •1"*°' 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in com 
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial'K 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
 a m ' 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of th 
United States, than according to the rules of the con^  
mon law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States. 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial 
power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of 
the same state with themselves; they shall name in 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each. 
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presi-
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ma-
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and 
if no person have such majority, then from the per-
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three 
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on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bal-
lot, the President. But in choosing the President, the 
votes shall be taken by states, the representation 
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a member or members from 
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President when-
ever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, be-
fore the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of 
the death or other constitutional disability of the 
President.—The person having the greatest number 
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole num-
ber of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the 
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a 
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of 
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no 
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of Pres-
ident shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the 
United States. 
AMENDMENT XIII 
Section 
1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendmen t . ] 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protec-
tion.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be 
paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due p roces s of law — 
Equal protect ion.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representat ives — P o w e r to r e d u c e ap-
pointment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to 
vote at any election for the choice of electors for Presi-
dent and Vice-President of the United States, Repre-
sentatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citi-
zens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in 
the proportion which the number of such male citi-
zens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President, 
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United 
States, or under any State, who, having previously 
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an 
officer of the United States, or as a member of any 
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer 
of any State, to support the Constitution of the 
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to 
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of 
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public deb t not to be ques t ioned — 
Debts of the Confederacy and c la ims 
not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for pay-
ment of pensions and bounties for services in sup-
pressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be ques-
tioned. But neither the United States nor any State 
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred 
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of 
any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims 
shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to 
disqualify.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or 
color not to disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this arti-
cle by appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax.] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, 
without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration. 
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(a) persons charged with a capital offense 
when there is substantial evidence to support the 
charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on pro-
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting 
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is 
substantial evidence to support the new felony 
charge; or 
(c) persons charged with a crime, as defined by 
statute, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the charge and the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the person would 
constitute a substantial danger to self or any 
other person or to the community or is likely to 
flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on 
bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pend-
ing appeal only as prescribed by law. 1989 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel pun-
ishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines 
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or impris-
oned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
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Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, ex-
cept in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall con-
sist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the ju-
rors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 1896 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
1896 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indict-
ment — Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, un-
less the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment. The for-
mation of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 
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Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — 
Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal pros-
ecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence 
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the 
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party 
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Excep-
tion.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time 
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the 
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law. 
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Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Im-
pairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed 
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Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in 
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies 
or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two 
witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil 
power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the 
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be 
quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner; nor in time of war except in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within this 
State. 18% 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation. 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably an> 
franchise, privilege or immunity. 1896 
